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A protocol for multiparty quantum secret splitting is proposed with an ordered N Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs and Bell-state measurements. It is secure and has the high intrinsic
efficiency and source capacity as almost all the instances are useful and each EPR pair carries two
bits of message securely. Moreover, we modify it for multiparty quantum state sharing of an arbitrary
m-particle entangled state based on quantum teleportation with only Bell-state measurements and
local unitary operations which make this protocol more convenient in a practical application than
others.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum information, an ingenious application of
quantum mechanics within the field of information has
attracted a lot of attentions [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. In par-
ticular almost all the branches of quantum commu-
nication have been developed quickly since the orig-
inal protocol was proposed by Bennett and Brassard
[6] in 1984, such as quantum key distribution (QKD)
[6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14], quantum secure direction
communication (QSDC) [15, 16, 17], quantum teleporta-
tion [3, 4], quantum secret sharing (QSS) [18, 19, 20, 21,
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36],
and so on. QKD provides a secure way for creating a pri-
vate key between two remote parties. With a private key,
most of the goals in classical secure communication can
be accomplished. For example, a classical secret message
can be transmitted securely by using classical one-time
pad crypto-system with a private key. To date, QKD has
progressed quickly and becomes one of the most mature
applications of quantum information.
QSS is likely to play a key role in both transmit-
ting of a classical information and protecting a secret
quantum information, such as in secure operations of
distributed quantum computation, sharing difficult-to-
construct ancillary states and joint sharing of quantum
money [24, 33]. Suppose a banker, Alice, wants her two
agents, Bob and Charlie who are at remote places to deal
with her business according to her message (MA). How-
ever Alice doubts that one of them may be dishonest and
the business may be destroyed if the dishonest one man-
ages it independently. Moreover Alice does not know who
the dishonest one is, but she knows that the number of
dishonest person is less than two. To prevent the dishon-
est man from destroying the business, classical cryptogra-
phy provides the secret sharing scheme [37] in which Al-
ice splits her message (MA) into two sequences (MB and
MC) and sends them to Bob and Charlie, respectively.
They can read out the message MA = MB ⊕MC if and
only if they cooperate, otherwise they will get nothing.
QSS is the generalization of classical secret sharing [37]
into quantum scenario and supplies a secure way for shar-
ing not only a classical information [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]
but also a quantum information [25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31,
32, 33]. In the latter, the sender, Alice will send an un-
known quantum state to her m agents and one of them
can recover it with the help of the others [32]. Com-
pared with QKD, QSS can reduce the the resources nec-
essary for the communication [23] for a classical secret
information. Moreover, the sharing and the splitting of
an unknown quantum state should resort to QSS with
quantum entanglement, which is called quantum state
sharing [36] (abbreviate it as QSTS for the difference
from QSS of a classical information [32]) recently, and
cannot be implemented in only a classical way. For
example, Li et al. proposed a QSTS scheme for shar-
ing an unknown single qubit with m agents. In their
scheme, Alice shares m Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
pairs with the m agents, and she performs an (m + 1)-
particle Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state mea-
surement on the unknown quantum system and her m
EPR particles. m − 1 agents take a single-particle mea-
surement on their EPR particles and the last agent can
recover the original unknown state with the helps of all
the other agents.
Quantum teleportation [3, 4] is a quantum technique
with which the two remote parties, the sender Alice
and the receiver Bob, exploit the nonlocal correlations
of the quantum channel shared in advance, such as an
Einstin-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair, to teleport an un-
known quantum state |φ〉u = α| ↑〉 + β| ↓〉. The task
can be accomplished by means that Alice makes a Bell-
basis measurement on her EPR particle and the unknown
quantum system u, and Bob reconstructs the state |φ〉u
with a local unitary operation on his EPR particle ac-
cording to the classical information published by Alice
[3, 4].
In this paper, we will propose a protocol for multiparty
2quantum secret splitting with EPR pairs following some
ideas in Refs. [15, 17, 24]. It has the high intrinsic effi-
ciency and source capacity as almost all the instances are
useful and each EPR pair carries two bits of message se-
curely. Moreover, we modify it for multiparty quantum
state sharing (MQSTS) of an arbitrary m-particle en-
tangled state based on quantum teleportation [38]. The
parties exploit EPR pairs and Bell-state measurements
to accomplish this task, which makes this protocol more
convenient in a practical application than others.
II. MULTIPARTY QUANTUM SECRET
SPLITTING WITH EPR PAIRS
In a QSS, its security is simplified to prevent the dis-
honest agent from eavesdropping freely as the parties can
detected any eavesdropper if they can find out the dis-
honest one in the agents [19]. Our multiparty quantum
secret splitting (MQSSP) protocol inherits this feature.
For convenience, let us first describe a three-party quan-
tum secret splitting protocol, and then generalize it to
the case with N agents, similar to Ref. [24].
An EPR pair is in one of the four Bell states shown as
following [1]:
∣∣ψ±〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|0〉A |1〉B ± |1〉A |0〉B), (1)
∣∣φ±〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|0〉A |0〉B ± |1〉A |1〉B). (2)
where |0〉 and |1〉 are the two eigenvectors of a two-level
quantum system, and the subscripts A and B represent
the two particles in an EPR pair. The four local unitary
operations Ui (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) can transform one of the Bell
states into another.
U0 ≡ I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|, (3)
U1 ≡ σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|, (4)
U2 ≡ σx = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|, (5)
U3 ≡ iσy = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|, (6)
where I is the 2× 2 identity matrix and σi are the Pauli
matrices.
Suppose the three parties in the MQSTS are the sender
Alice and her two agents, Bob and Charlie. The basic
idea of our MQSTS protocol is that the two photons in
each EPR pairs prepared by the agent Bob are not trans-
mitted simultaneously in the insecure quantum channel,
and Alice codes her message with four local unitary oper-
ations after confirming the security of the channel, same
as the two-step QSDC scheme [15]. We can describe our
MQSTS protocol in detail as follows.
(1) Alice, Bob and Charlie agree on that the four local
unitary operations U0, U1, U2 and U3 represent the two
bits of information 00, 11, 01 and 10, respectively. They
use the two measuring bases (MBs), Z ≡ {|0〉, |1〉} and
X ≡ {|+ x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), | − x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)} (for
instance, the polarizations of a photon along z− and x−
directions), to measure the sample photons randomly in
the process of eavesdropping check.
(2) The agent Bob prepares an ordered N EPR po-
larization photon pairs in the same quantum state, say
|ψ−〉AC = 1√
2
(|0〉A|1〉C − |1〉A|0〉C). We denote the N
ordered EPR pairs with [(P1(A),P1(C)), (P2(A),P2(C)),
(P3(A),P3(C)), ..., (PN (A),PN (C))], same as Refs. [9,
15, 40].
(3) Bob takes one photon from each EPR pair to form
an ordered EPR partner photon sequence, say [P1(A),
P2(A), P3(A), ... , PN (A)], called the SA sequence.
The remaining EPR partner photons compose another
EPR partner photon sequence [P1(C), P2(C), P3(C), ...
, PN(C)], which is called the SC sequence.
(4) Bob fist sends the SA sequence to Alice and keeps
the SC sequence. Alice picks out a sufficiently large sub-
set of photons from the sequence SA for the eavesdrop-
ping check of the transmission.
The check can be completed with the following pro-
cedures: (a) Alice tell Bob which photons he has chosen
and Bob picks out the correlated photons in the sequence
SC . (b) Bob chooses randomly the measuring basis (MB)
Z or X to measure the chosen photons. (c) Bob tells Al-
ice which MB he has chosen for each photon and the
outcomes of his measurements. (d) Alice uses the same
MBs as Bob to measure the corresponding photons and
checks the eavesdropping with the results of Bob’s. If no
eavesdropping exists, their results should be completely
opposite in an ideal condition, i.e., if Alice gets 0 (1), then
Bob gets 1 (0). This is the first eavesdropping check.
After that, if the error rate ε1 is small, Alice and Bob
can conclude that there are no eavesdroppers in the line.
Alice and Bob continue to perform step 5; otherwise they
have to discard their transmission and abort the commu-
nication.
(5) Bob chooses randomly one of the four local unitary
operations Ui (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) to encrypt each of the pho-
tons in the sequence SC , say UB, and then he sends the
sequence SC to Alice.
(6) Alice analyzes the error rate ε2 of the transmission
of SC . This is the second eavesdropping check. For this
end, Alice first picks up k+j EPR photon pairs and then
requires Bob to publish the operations UB with which he
has operated on these pairs. Alice takes the single-photon
measurements on the two photons of k pairs by choosing
randomly the MB X or Z. For the other j pairs, she only
measures one photon in each pair with the MB Z or X
chosen randomly. She uses the other photons in these
pairs as the decoy photons for checking eavesdropping in
the next step.
(7) Alice inserts randomly the decoy photons in the se-
quence SC and then sends it to Charlie. They analyze the
security of this transmission with the decoy photons. If
they conclude that the quantum line is secure, they con-
tinue their communication to next step; otherwise, they
discard the results and repeat the quantum communica-
tion from the beginning.
3(8) Alice selects a subset of photons as the samples for
eavesdropping check and chooses one of the four unitary
operations randomly on each sample. For other photons
in the SA sequence (except for those for eavesdropping
check), Alice encodes her message MA on them with the
four unitary operations, and then sends the sequence SA
to Charlie.
(9) Charlie performs the Bell measurements on the
EPR photon pairs and reads out the combination of the
operations done by Alice and Bob, i.e., UC = UA ⊗ UB.
(10) Alice and Charlie finish the error rate of the sam-
ples selected by Alice, and determine whether there are
eavesdroppers monitoring the quantum channel when the
SA is transmitted from Alice to Charlie. For this end, Al-
ice first requires Bob to publish the operations done on
the correlated photons in the sequence SC , and then she
requires Charlie to tell her the results of the Bell measure-
ments. If the transmission of the SA sequence is secure,
Alice tells Bob and Charlie to collaborate for reading out
the messageMA, otherwise they will abandon the results
of the transmission.
This MQSSP protocol follows some ideas in the
two-step QSDC scheme [15] and the Bennett-Brassard-
Mermin 1992 (BBM92) QKD protocol [11]. The pro-
cess for the transmission of the SA sequence from Bob
to Alice is same as that in Ref. [15], and its security is
same as the BBM92 QKD protocol [11] whose security
is proven in both an ideal condition [41] and a practi-
cal condition [42]. So the process for the transmission of
the SA sequence is secure for any eavesdropper includ-
ing the agent Charlie. The operation done by Bob on
each photon in the SC is equivalent to the encryption on
the photon with a random key, which makes any other
one have no ability for reading out the information on
the photon, same as the quantum one time pad [7, 16].
That is, any eavesdropper except the agent Bob cannot
eavesdrop the message MA even though he monitors the
quantum channel in the subsequent processes.
The goal that the SC sequence is first transmitted to
Alice before Alice encodes her message on the SA se-
quence is to prevent Bob from eavesdropping with a fake
signal and cheat freely. The eavesdropping check of the
transmission of the SC sequence is necessary for Alice and
Charlie with some decoy photons. Also, the cheating of
Bob’s will be found out by comparing the results of the
measurements on the decoy photons. After the processes
for the secure transmission of the SA sequence from Bob
to Alice and that of the SC sequence from Alice to Char-
lie, any one cannot steal the message MA except that
Bob and Charlie cooperate. Then the present MQSSP
protocol is secure.
In fact, the security in each procedure of the trans-
mission of the particle sequences is ensured by the eaves-
dropping check in this scheme, which is different to Ref.
[24]. In the latter, the agent Bob does not sample his
particles and measure them, which makes it insecure if
the other agent Charlie wants to steal Bob’s information
with multi-photon fake signal, similar to Ref. [28]. That
is, Charlie intercepts the signal transmitted from Alice
to Bob, and sends some photons in the EPR pairs with
same Bell state in a time slot. Charlie can obtain almost
all the information about the operations done by Bob
with photon number splitters. Moreover, she can read
out the information with a suitable delay Trojan horse
attack [39]. This case does not happen in this scheme.
The generalization of this MQSSP protocol to the case
with N agents can be implemented in a simple way by
modifying the processes in the case with two agents. We
describe it after the step 4 discussed above.
(5’) Bob chooses randomly one of the four local uni-
tary operations Ui (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) to encrypt each of the
photons in the sequence SC , say UB, and then he sends
the sequence SC to next agent, Charile.
(6’) Alice and Charlie analyze the error rate of this
transmission by choosing randomly a subset of the EPR
pairs and requires Bob to tell them his operations UB on
these samples. They measure their sample photons with
the correlated MBs, same as that between Alice and Bob.
If the error rate is lower than the threshold value, Char-
lie operates the photons in the sequence SC by choosing
randomly one of the four operations Ui (i = 0, 1, 2, 3).
Also, he picks up some samples from SC and performs
a Hadamard operation on each sample. He sends the
sequence to the next agent Dick.
(7’) Alice and Dick complete the eavesdropping check
of this transmission, same as that between Alice and
Charlie. The difference is that Charlie should attend
to check eavesdropping in this time. He publishes some
positions of the the photons operated with Hadamard op-
erations, and then Alice and Dick confirm whether there
is an eavesdropper who has stolen the information about
the operations done by Charlie. If the quantum com-
munication is still secure, Dick repeats the procedure of
Charlie’s and sends the sequence SC to the next agent.
(8’) After repeating the step 7’ N-3 times, the SC se-
quence is received securely by Yang, the agent before the
last one Zach. After the operations done by Yang, sim-
ilar to Charlie, he sends the sequence SC to Alice (Not
Zach!).
(9’) Alice analyzes the error rate of the transmission of
SC between her and Yang. She first picks up k + j EPR
photon pairs and then requires all the agents except for
the last one to publish their operations with which he has
operated on these pairs. Alice takes the single-photon
measurements on the two photons of k pairs by choosing
randomly the MB X or Z. For the other j pairs, she only
measures one photon in each pair with the MB Z or X
chosen randomly. She uses the other photons in these
pairs as the decoy photons for checking eavesdropping
in the next step. Certainly, Yang should tell Alice the
photons operated with Hadamard operations and they
analyze their error rate after the other agents publish
their operations on these photons.
(10’) Alice inserts randomly the decoy photons in the
sequence SC and then sends it to the last agent Zach.
They analyze the security of this transmission with the
4decoy photons. If they conclude that the quantum line is
secure, they continue their communication to next step;
otherwise, they discard the results and repeat the quan-
tum communication from the beginning.
(11’) Alice selects a subset of photons as the samples
for eavesdropping check and chooses one of the four uni-
tary operations randomly on each sample. For other pho-
tons in the SA sequence (except for those for eavesdrop-
ping check), Alice encodes her messageMA on them with
the four unitary operations, and then sends the sequence
SA to Zach.
(12’) Zach performs the Bell-state measurements on
the EPR photon pairs and reads out the combination of
the operations done by Alice and Bob, i.e., UZ = UA ⊗
UB ⊗ UC ⊗ · · · ⊗ UY .
(13’) Alice and Zach finish the error rate of the samples
selected by Alice, and determine whether there are eaves-
droppers monitoring the quantum channel when the SA
is transmitted from Alice to Charlie. For this end, Al-
ice first requires all the agents to publish the operations
done on the correlated photons in the sequence SC , and
then she requires Zach to tell her the results of the Bell
measurements. If the transmission of the SA sequence is
secure, Alice tells all the agents to collaborate for read-
ing out the messageMA, otherwise they will abandon the
results of the transmission.
The security of this multiparty quantum secret split-
ting protocol is same as that with two agents as each
process for the transmission of the photons is same as
that in BBM92 QKD protocol [11]. That is, the process
for secure transmission of photons in BBM92 QKD is re-
peated N + 2 times. So this multiparty quantum secret
splitting is secure also.
III. MQSTS OF AN ARBITRARY M-PARTICLE
STATE WITH EPR PAIRS
The state of an M-particle quantum system x can be
written as following:
|ψ〉x =
∑
i,j,...,k∈{0,1}
Cij...k| ij . . . k︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
〉, (7)
where
∑
i,j,...,k∈{0,1}
|Cij...k|2 = 1. (8)
The state |ψ〉x can be teleported with M EPR pairs com-
pletely [38]. That is, the protocol for quantum secret
splitting of classical message discussed above can be mod-
ified to accomplish the task of multiparty quantum state
sharing (MQSTS) with quantum teleportation. We de-
pict it with three partes (Alice, Bob and Charlie) in brief
as follows.
(I) Alice and Bob share an ordered N EPR pairs pri-
vately using the same way as that for quantum secret
splitting discussed above.
SA SC
x
FIG. 1: The Bell measurements performed by Alice. The
bold lines connect the two photons in an EPR pair or the
M-particle quantum system x. The panes with dashed lines
are the Bell-state measurements.
(II) Bob chooses randomly one of the four unitary op-
eration Ui (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) to encrypt each photon in the SC
sequence, and then sends the sequence to Alice. She picks
up k+ j EPR pairs and requires Bob to tell her the oper-
ations on these samples. She analyzes the security of the
transmission for the sequence SC by measuring K pairs
with MB Z or X on the two photons in each pair. Then
she performs a single-photon measurement on one photon
in each of the other j EPR pairs in the samples. She uses
the photons collapsed as the decoy photons for checking
eavesdropping in the next step by inserting them in the
sequence Sc. She sends the sequence SC to Charlie
(III) Alice and Charlie finish the eavesdropping check
for the transmission of the SC sequence with the decoy
photons. If the error rate is low, they continue to the next
step, otherwise they abandon the results transmitted and
repeat the quantum communication from the beginning.
(IV) Alice picks out M EPR pairs from the N ordered
EPR photon pairs (N ≥ M), i.e., she select M photon
in the SA sequence in order. Then she performs a Bell-
state measurement on each photon and a particle from
the quantum system x, shown in Fig.1.
(V) Alice publishes the results of the Bell-state mea-
surements in public, and Charlie can reconstructs the
quantum system x with the help of Bob’s.
In fact, this quantum state sharing protocol is just a
process that Alice teleports the M-particle quantum sys-
tem to Charlie who does not know the states of the quan-
tum channel, i.e., those of the EPR pairs shared. Let us
use a two-particle quantum system as an example to de-
scribe the principle in detail. The other case is the same
as it with or without a little modification.
Assume that the unknown two-particle state |ψ〉x is
|ψ〉x ≡ |φ〉X1X2 = a|00〉 + b|01〉 + c|10〉 + d|11〉, here
|a|2+ |b|2+ |c|2+ |d|2 = 1. Alice and Charlie first pick out
two EPR pairs from the N ordered EPR pairs shared, say
5TABLE I: The relation between the local unitary operations
and the results |φ〉X1A1 and |φ〉X2A2 . |Φ〉C1C2 is the state
of the two particles hold in the hand of Charlie after all the
measurements are done by Alice; Ui⊗Uj are the local unitary
operations with which Charlie can reconstruct the unknown
arbitrary entangled state |Φ〉X1X2 .
|φ〉X1A1 |φ〉X2A2 (U
−1
B1
⊗ U−1B2 )|Φ〉C1C2 Ui ⊗ Uj
φ+ φ+ a|11〉 − b|10〉 − c|01〉 + d|00〉 U3 ⊗ U3
φ+ φ− a|11〉 + b|10〉 − c|01〉 − d|00〉 U3 ⊗ U2
φ+ ψ+ a|10〉 − b|11〉 − c|00〉 + d|01〉 U3 ⊗ U1
φ+ ψ− a|10〉 + b|11〉 − c|00〉 − d|01〉 U3 ⊗ U0
φ− φ+ a|11〉 − b|10〉 + c|01〉 − d|00〉 U2 ⊗ U3
φ− φ− a|11〉 + b|10〉 + c|01〉 + d|00〉 U2 ⊗ U2
φ− ψ+ a|10〉 − b|11〉 + c|00〉 − d|01〉 U2 ⊗ U1
φ− ψ− a|10〉 + b|11〉 + c|00〉 + d|01〉 U2 ⊗ U0
ψ+ φ+ a|01〉 − b|00〉 − c|11〉 + d|10〉 U1 ⊗ U3
ψ+ φ− a|01〉 + b|00〉 − c|11〉 − d|10〉 U1 ⊗ U2
ψ+ ψ+ a|00〉 − b|01〉 − c|10〉 + d|11〉 U1 ⊗ U1
ψ+ ψ− a|00〉 + b|01〉 − c|10〉 − d|11〉 U1 ⊗ U0
ψ− φ+ a|01〉 − b|00〉 + c|11〉 − d|10〉 U0 ⊗ U3
ψ− φ− a|01〉 + b|00〉 + c|11〉 + d|10〉 U0 ⊗ U2
ψ− ψ+ a|00〉 − b|01〉 + c|10〉 − d|11〉 U0 ⊗ U1
ψ− ψ− a|00〉 + b|01〉 + c|10〉 + d|11〉 U0 ⊗ U0
|φ〉A1C1 and |φ〉A2C2 , and then Alice performs the Bell-
state measurements on the particles X1 and A1, and X2
and A2, respectively. She publishes the outcomes. If
Charlie knows the states of the EPR pairs shared be-
tween him and Alice, he can recover the unknown quan-
tum state |ψ〉x with the local unitary operations Ui⊗Uj.
Here the operations Ui and Uj are the two local unitary
operations done by Charlie on the two photons C1 and
C2, respectively. As the original states of the EPR pairs
are |ψ−〉AC = 1√
2
(|0〉A|1〉C − |1〉A|0〉C), Charlie should
obtain the operations UB done by Bob on the photons
in the Sc sequence. That is, Charlie can recover the un-
known quantum state only when he collaborate with Bob.
The relation between the local unitary operations and the
information published by Alice is shown in Table I. Here
UB1 and UB2 are the two local unitary operations done by
Bob on the EPR pairs |φ〉A1C1 and |φ〉A1C1 , respectively.
U−1B1 ⊗UB1 = I and U−1B2 ⊗UB2 = I. (U−1B1 ⊗U−1B2 )|Φ〉C1C2
is the state of the two photons C1 and C2 after the op-
erations U−1B1 and U
−1
B2
on them respectively.
The way for generalize this MQSTS protocol to the
case with N agents is similar to that in the multiparty
quantum secret splitting.
IV. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
As discussed in Refs. [15, 16, 17, 40], the direct trans-
mission of secret message should resort to the transmis-
sion of quantum data block. The parties should confirm
the security of the quantum channel before the message
is encoded on the states. In present multiparty quantum
secret splitting and quantum state sharing protocols, the
states are transmitted in quantum data block. The good
feature is that the error correction [1] and the quantum
privacy amplification [43] can be done on the states di-
rectly, which will ensure the security of those quantum
communication protocols in a practical channel. In a
loss channel, Alice and Charlie should prevent Bob from
eavesdropping with quantum teleportation, same as the
two step QSDC protocol [15]. That is, Charlie will deter-
mine which position in the SC sequence has no photon
and tell Alice not perform encoding the message on the
correlated photon in the SA sequence.
In present multiparty quantum secret splitting proto-
col, each EPR pair can carry two bits of information and
its security is ensured by the eavesdropping checks with
the single-photon measurements between the sender and
the agents. The efficiency for qubits ηq ≡ quqt approaches
the maximal value 100% as almost all the EPR pairs are
useful for carrying the message in principle, and here qu is
the useful qubits and qt is the total qubits transmitted.
The total efficiency ηt in this protocol also approaches
100% as the classical information exchanged is not nec-
essary except for the eavesdropping checks. η is defined
as [8, 9]
ηt =
bm
qt + bt
, (9)
where bm is the number of bits in the messageMA, qt and
bt are the qubits used and the classical bits exchanged
between the parties in the quantum communication, re-
spectively.
For sharing the unknown quantum state, the agent Bob
plays a role for preparing the quantum source and en-
crypting a classical information on them also. The last
agent will recover the unknown quantum state with the
help of the other agents as he keeps the only quantum
system for the reconstruction after all the Bell measure-
ments are done by Alice. In this way, the present mul-
tiparty quantum state sharing protocol is asymmetrical,
which is same as that in Ref. [27] and is different to the
symmetrical protocols [31, 32] in which any one in the
agents can act as the receiver with the help of others’.
Certainly, any cheating done by the agents including the
receiver can be detected if the sender and the agents ac-
complish a honesty check before the agents cooperate to
recover the unknown states. That is, Alice inserts ran-
domly some samples in the unknown quantum system x
and requires the agents to recover their states and mea-
sure them before they obtain the quantum information,
same as that in Ref. [20]. The total efficiency ηt of this
multiparty quantum state sharing protocol is about 50%
as Alice should publish two bits of classical information
for two bits of quantum information.
In summary, we present a way for multiparty quan-
tum secret splitting with an ordered N EPR pairs fol-
lowing some ideas in Ref. [15, 17, 24]. It is secure and
6each of the EPR pairs can carry two bits of message.
Its efficiency for qubits and the total efficiency both ap-
proach the maximal value 100%. Moreover, we modify
it for multiparty quantum state sharing (MQSTS) of an
arbitrary M -particle entangled state based on quantum
teleportation. For the latter, the task is completed with
the quantum channel of two-particle entanglement and
the two-particle Bell-state measurements, which make it
more convenient in a practical application than others as
it is difficult for producing and measuring a multipartite
entangled states at present [44, 45, 46].
V. NOTE
This paper appeared in PLA. However, there is a se-
curity loophole in the original manuscript (also for other
schemes with the similar principle). It is necessary for
us to forbid the dishonest agent eavesdrop the quan-
tum communication with a fake signal (a Bell state) and
cheat. In this way, the boss Alice should have the capa-
bility of detecting cheat. In this revision, we added some
procedures for detecting cheat and made this protocol be
secure.
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